On August 7 this year, the Chief of Defence Staff of India, General Anil Chauhan, released the Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations. The unveiling of this declassified document represents India’s formal acknowledgement that future warfare will be as much about bytes as bullets. While the doctrine articulates laudable strategic ambitions, its success will ultimately depend on addressing several practical challenges that need to be discussed, explored and harmonised.

The doctrine’s core premise — that cyber threats transcend traditional service boundaries — reflects hard-learned lessons from global conflicts. The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia, which paralysed the nation’s digital infrastructure, demonstrated how adversaries could achieve strategic objectives without firing a single shot. Similarly, the 2010 Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities showed how cyber operations could achieve kinetic effects, blurring the lines between digital and physical warfare. India’s own experience reinforces this reality. The 2020 Mumbai power grid attack, allegedly linked to Chinese hackers, illustrated how critical infrastructure vulnerabilities could be exploited during military tensions. Not to miss the recent info war using digital media and cyber attacks during Operation Sindoor.

The doctrine’s emphasis on “threat-informed planning and real-time intelligence integration” acknowledges cyber warfare’s unique characteristics. Unlike conventional military operations that follow established patterns, cyber attacks can emerge from state actors, criminal networks, or lone hackers with equal destructive potential. The 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack, which affected over 300,000 computers globally within days, exemplifies how rapidly cyber threats can escalate beyond traditional containment strategies.

However, the doctrine’s most ambitious goal — achieving true jointness in cyberspace — faces significant structural obstacles. The Indian military’s historical tendency toward service-specific cultures runs deep. Each service has developed distinct procurement systems, operational protocols, and technological preferences over decades. The Army’s focus on tactical cyber capabilities, the Navy’s emphasis on maritime domain awareness, and the Air Force’s space-cyber integration represent fundamentally different approaches to the same domain.

Consider the ongoing challenges with India’s Defence Cyber Agency, established in 2019. Despite its mandate to coordinate tri-service cyber operations, reports suggest that resource allocation, operational authority, and intelligence sharing still remain non-optimal. The doctrine’s success will require overcoming these institutional barriers that have proven resistant to reform efforts.

Link: https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/cyber-doctrine-indias-warfare-cyber-war-operation-sindoor-10182442/